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Abstract
Current techniques for building formal proofs interactively involve one or several proof languages for
instructing an interpreter of the languages to build or check the proof being described. These linguistic
approaches have a drawback: the languages are not generally portable, even though the nature of logical
reasoning is universal. We propose a somewhat speculative alternative method that lets the user directly
manipulate the text of the theorem, using non-linguistic metaphors. It uses a proof formalism based on
linking subformulas, which is a variant of deep inference (inference rules are allowed to apply in any formula
context) where the relevant formulas in a rule are allowed to be arbitrarily distant. We substantiate the
design with a prototype implementation of a linking-based interactive prover for first-order classical linear
logic.
1 Introduction
Formal proofs are more fundamentally computational than mathematical. Say we want to prove (a⊃ b)⊃ (b⊃
c)⊃ (a⊃ c). Current proof languages are generally always languages of interaction, so a proof is an arrangement
of instructions to a stateful interpreter that allows it to build (or check) an underlying proof object in a trusted
natural deduction or a sequent calculus formulation of the logic. A formal proof of this theorem is, therefore,
something like this;
Suppose (1) a ⊃ b, (2) b ⊃ c, (3) a; to show c, we backchain (2) to change the goal to b, then we
backchain (1) to change it to a, which we already have by (3).
(Most proof languages can express the above more succinctly.) This proof naturally resembles a computational
trace where the steps of the computation are the (primitive or derived) inference rules of the logic, possibly with
the use of additional lemmas. However, this formal proof obscures the simple mathematical intuition behind
the proof, function composition; indeed, the composition is fully unfolded and sequentialized. In order to write
the more natural mathematical proof, the user would first have to find a lemma in the standard library (or
write one) that implements this intuition.
Because formal proof languages are more closely tied to the underlying calculus, and often to formal theories,
they are generally not portable as such across different systems. In the rare instances where two different formal
proof systems (take, e.g., Coq and Isabelle) do exchange proof objects, they tend to be low-level “logical
bytecode” (λ-terms built internally by the proof tactics or rewriting traces) that bear no resemblance to the
proof text a user actually writes and are not expected to be read by humans (some examples: [17, 5]). Only the
most committed (and masochistic) user learns to be proficient in many systems, so the communities of users of
formal systems have become rather balkanized. It is worth asking if there is a sense in which one can build an
interactive prover free of the shackles of language.
To answer this question, let us begin by noting that a proof fundamentally consists of two varieties of
reasoning: reasoning about the subformula structure, and reasoning about links between different subformulas.
Examples of the first variety are: to prove the goal A ∧ B create two independent subgoals for A and B, or
to use an assumption ∀x.A add an instantiation [t/x]A as an additional assumption. Examples of the second
variety are: to prove the goal A search for an assumption A (use of hypothesis), or to prove the goal C first
prove A and then show that C follows from A (cut or substitution). The language for establishing the links is
surprisingly similar across proof languages; they generally always use hypothesis labels and terms such as apply
or assert. Structural reasoning differs widely, however; at one end of a spectrum are languages based on tactics
that drive a stateful prover through a proof tree, while at the other end are languages that reify the proof tree
textually in the proof document but do not prescribe an order of evaluation. Crucially, though, the entire point
of the structural reasoning is to enable the links, which are the only ways to finish and compose proofs and are
therefore the essence of a proof, so the surprising design focus on structural reasoning seems misplaced.
How can one make linking the primary aspect of formal proof construction? Unsurprisingly, this question
has been asked and answered a number of times, but never satisfactorily. This paper combines two existing
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answers—proof by pointing [4] and the calculus of structures [7, 15]—in a way that improves on both and
suggests a research direction.
Proof by pointing is the first attempt to systematically construct a non-linguistic interaction method on top
of an existing proof interaction language such as the tactics language of Coq [3]. The user proves a theorem
by a sequence of mouse clicks on subformulas; each click brings the indicated formula to the foreground of
the current goal, and possibly creates additional background subgoals. Depending on the occurrence of the
subformula, each click is interpreted as a sequence of tactics that mimics a sequence of sequent rules. Once
a subformula is brought into the foreground on both sides of the sequent arrow, the corresponding link is
established and the goal is closed. The problem with the pointing approach appears after this closure: the
remaining subgoals that were produced to establish the link are left in an “exposed” state and may be difficult
to reason about subsequently. To illustrate, in the earlier example of (a ⊃ b) ⊃ (b ⊃ c) ⊃ (a ⊃ c) the user can
click on (i.e., point to) the two occurrences of b. The residual goals after the main goal is closed are: a⊃ b⊢ a
and a⊃ b, b⊃ c, c⊢ a⊃ c; the former goal is unprovable! This does not correspond to the intuition of linking the
two bs, i.e., of composing the assumptions a⊃ b and b ⊃ c to get a new assumption a⊃ c, which would match
the succedent of the original theorem.
The problem with the example above is that interpreting clicks as applications of sequent rules destroys the
surrounding formula context by bringing the indicated subformula to the top of the sequent. The interaction
method is inherently deep (working on arbitrary subformulas), but the underlying shallow calculus prevents
deep reasoning. The user is forced to think about the order of clicks to ensure that the sequents have the right
shape. For instance, in the above example the user would have to click on the rightmost a first, which would
ensure that when the bs are finally clicked on that the first residual subgoal is not a⊃ b⊢ a but a, a⊃ b⊢ a.
To escape the bureaucracy of sequential syntax, we require a calculus of deep inference that can preserve
formula contexts and thereby perform logically unrelated reasoning steps in a free order. In this paper we use
the calculus of structures where there is no difference between a formula and a sequent, and proof steps are
allowed to apply in any formula context. Unfortunately, the calculus of structures by itself cannot support our
desired linking procedure above either, because every rule in the calculus is still limited to immediate operands
of the principal connectives. (The two bs in the example were only ancestrally linked.) We need to generalize the
calculus of structures so that the interacting subformulas may be themselves separated by other subformulas.
As the main technical contribution, this paper gives a calculus for linked structures for first-order classical
linear logic (Sec. 3). We pick linear logic because: (1) it seamlessly encodes many intuitionistic and classical
logics and has clean proof-theoretic foundations; (2) it directly represents resource-nondeterministic choices
(splitting and sharing) that are essential when reasoning about computations; and (3) it is an extension to proof
by pointing that was left to future work in [4, 11]. We substantiate the claims in the paper by a prototype
implementation of a linking-based proof-assistant called Profound (Sec. 4). Our implementation is not currently
integrated with any mainstream theorem proving system, so it should be seen as conceptual and somewhat
speculative.
2 The Calculus of Structures for Linear Logic
Let us begin with an overview of the calculus of structures for classical first-order linear logic. Formulas (written
A,B, . . . ) have the following grammar,
A,B, . . . ::= a A⊗ B 1 A⊕ B 0 !A ∃x.A
| a A
&
B
T
A&B T ?A ∀x.A
Atomic formulas (or atoms) are written using a, b, . . . , and the negation of a is written as a. We use the term
literal to refer to either an atom or a negated atom. Each atomic formula is of the form p(t1, . . . , tn) where p
is a predicate symbol and t1, . . . , tn are first-order terms (written s, t, . . . ) formed from term variables (written
x, y, . . . ) and applications of function symbols (written f, g, . . . ) to terms. As is standard, we assume an ambient
signature for the logic that assigns arities to predicate and function symbols. Formulas are in negation-normal
form with each vertical column in the above grammar depicting one De Morgan dual pair; we write A for the
dual of A.
For our definition of truth in this logic, we use a standard one-sided cut-free sequent calculus—called system
LLK—consisting of sequents of the form ⊢Γ, where Γ is a multiset of formulas. Figure 1 contains the rules of
LLK. The meta-theory of this calculus can be found in any standard reference [10, 19].
The calculus of structures is a formalism where there is no difference between formula and sequent. It is a
rewrite system where some entailment ⊢A,B are turned into rewrite rules that replace, reading from conclusion
to premises, a subformula B in a formula with A. The system is best described in a contextual form, where a
formula context (written χ, ξ, . . . ) is formed by replacing a single subformula of a formula by the hole (). We
write χ{A} for the formula formed by replacing the hole in χ by A (possibly capturing the free variables of A).
Figure 2 contains the rules of the classical linear system CLS, which is a minor variant of the system LS
from [7]. Each rule is to be understood as closed over a formula context; to illustrate, the rule id represents this
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⊢ a, a init
⊢Γ
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⊢Γ, ?A, ?A
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&
B
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T
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⊢Γ, ?A ?
⊢Γ, A
⊢Γ, ∀x.A ∀
Figure 1: Rules of LLK. In the ⊕ rule, i ∈ {1, 2}. In the ! rule, ?Γ stands for a multiset of formulas each of
which is prefixed by ?. In the ∀ rule, x is not free in the conclusion.
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Figure 2: Rules of CLS. In the chc rule, i ∈ {1, 2}. In the all rule, x is not free in B.
general schema.
χ{1}
χ{a
&
a}
The first line of rules in Fig. 2 are the structural rules of the system. They are, in order, the atomic identity rule;
rules for commutativity, associativity, and unit for
&
(due to which 〈
&
,
T
〉 behaves as a commutative monoid
structure); and weakening and contraction for ?-formulas. The second line contains logical rules corresponding
to the positive connectives: splits (lsp and rsp) for ⊗, choices (chc) for ⊕, promotion (bng), and instantiation
(wit). In the wit rule, the witness term t is only allowed to mention the bound variables in scope at the hole; in
other words, the signature over which conclusion and premise are well-formed does not change on the application
of any rule. The third line of rules contain the logical rules for the negative connectives: distributivity (add) for
&, absorption (top) for T, dereliction (drl) for ?, and scope-enlargement of universal quantification (all). The
final line of rules define the mechanisms of combining different successful “branches” of a CLS proof.
A derivation φ of B from A in any unary proof-system S, written φ : A
S
−−→B, is a sequence of rules of S
with the bottom-most rule having conclusion B and the top-most rule having premise A. We write just A
S
−−→B
to assert that there is a φ such that φ : A
S
−−→B. A proof φ of A in CLS is a derivation φ : 1
CLS
−−−→A. Under this
notion of proof, CLS is sound and complete with respect to the usual linear truth given in terms of LLK.
Theorem 1 (Soundness of CLS wrt. LLK). If A
CLS
−−−→B, then ⊢A,B in LLK.
Proof. Every inference rule in CLS with premise A and conclusion B corresponds to a provable sequent ⊢A,B
of LLK. The result follows by a sequence of applications of cut in LLK.
Theorem 2 (Completeness of CLS wrt. LLK). If ⊢A1, . . . , An in LLK, then 1
CLS
−−−→A1
&
· · ·
&
An.
Proof. Under the interpretation of an LLK sequent ⊢A1, . . . , An as the formula A1
&
· · ·
&
An, every rule of
LLK is derivable in CLS. Generally speaking, one LLK rule corresponds to a sequence of CLS rules; in particular,
the ⊗ rule of LLK corresponds to a sequence of applications of lsp and rsp, while the & rule corresponds to a
sequence of applications of add.
Although the system CLS is cut-free, the following cut rule is admissible:
χ
{
A⊗ A
}
χ{
T
}
cut
As usual, this rule is just the dual of the generalized identity (gid) rule:
χ{1}
χ
{
A
&
A
} gid
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Indeed, every rule of CLS has a dual form where the premise and conclusion are exchanged and dualized. The
dual system of CLS, which we write as CLS, is a system of refutation, where a refutation of A is a proof A
CLS
−−−→
T
,
and the system that contains both CLS and CLS is a system where both cut and identity can be reduced to their
atomic forms [7, 15]. Note that the rules lsp and rsp are self-duals, and therefore in the intersection of CLS and
its dual system.
3 Formula Linking
The system CLS forms the foundation of the underlying calculus of the formula linking approach. As mentioned
in the introduction, we would like to support a mode of interaction where the user can indicate that any two
subformulas are to be linked. The rules of CLS are not well suited for such interactions because each inference
rules operates on two immediately
&
-joined formulas.
The essence of linking is to generalize the interaction from
&
-joined formulas to formulas that are (eventually)
ancestrally joined by
&
. Then, the user can simply mark the formulas they wish to link and the system will
apply the right sequence of CLS rules to bring the linked formulas into the same context. If the linked formulas
are dual literals, then the system can simply replace the
&
-formula with 1. The user can therefore repeatedly
link dual literals when constructing a proof. (The user is of course free to link other non-atomic subformulas
as well.) Importantly, the user is allowed to make incorrect linkages that render the formula unprovable. We
require only that any provable formula be also provable by a linkage simplification procedure.
First, let us make the notion of linkage formal. We enlarge the syntax of formulas with a new form, u::A,
called a linkage, which indicates that the formula A is marked by a link u. (Links are drawn from some infinite
set that is disjoint from the set of variables.) We write u ∈ C to assert that C contains a subformula of the form
u::A. We require that every linkage in a formula occurs exactly twice, and that the two subformulas marked by
a link be ancestrally joined by
&
in the subformula ordering. In other words, for each link u ∈ C, there must
exist formula contexts ξ, χ1, χ2 and subformulas A and B of C such that C = ξ{χ1{u::A}
&
χ2{u::B}}. These
restrictions will be preserved by the linkage simplification rules.
The user initiates a linkage by marking two distinct ancestrally
&
-joined subformulas of the goal formula by
a fresh link. We write this as an inference rule that produces a new kind of connective ∗ (called interaction),
as follows:
ξ{χ1{u::A} ∗ χ2{u::B}}
ξ{χ1{A}
&
χ2{B}}
lnk
We restrict this rule to only be applicable when the conclusion formula is free of all linkages, although this
restriction can often be relaxed. Note that unlike the rules of CLS (Fig. 2), the rule lnk is doubly deep: not only
is the principal formula allowed to occur in any formula context, but also the result of applying the rule has an
effect on subformulas that are not necessarily the immediate descendants of the principal formula.
Semantically, ∗ has the same truth value as
&
, but the rules applicable to ∗ have more restrictions than the
analogous rules for
&
. If the immediate operands of the interaction are the linkages—i.e., if the context χ1 and
χ2 in the rule lnk above are just holes—then one of the following two rules will be applied.
χ{1}
χ{u::a ∗ u::a}
lnid
χ{A
&
B}
χ{u::A ∗ u::B}
unlnk
where the unlnk rule is only applicable when A and B are not dual literals.
The remaining rules for interaction connectives are used to permute it into smaller contexts. Defining these
rules requires a bit of caution, as best illustrated by an example.
Example 3. Let us temporarily ignore linkages and just consider the interaction connective ∗. Consider the
provable formula (a⊗ b)
&
(a& b)
&
(a⊕ b). Suppose the common
&
-ancestor a and the leftmost a is turned into
∗ with lnk.
(
(a⊗ b) ∗ (a& b)
)
&
(a⊕ b)
(a⊗ b)
&
(a& b)
&
(a⊕ b)
lnk
Let us attempt to use the same rules as
&
in CLS for the ∗-formulas. If we immediately apply a lsp to the
interaction formula in the premise above, we would obtain an unprovable formula:
(
(a ∗ (a& b))⊗ b
)
&
(a⊕ b)
(
(a⊗ b) ∗ (a& b)
)
&
(a⊕ b)
lsp
The issue here is that lsp forces both a and b (that are &-joined) to be “sent” to exactly one of the operands
of the ⊗, but the theorem is only provable if exactly one of the ⊗-operands gets exactly one of the &-operands.
This can be achieved by a different order of the inference rules, performing add before lsp as follows.
(
((a ∗ a)⊗ b)& (a⊗ (b ∗ b))
)
&
(a⊕ b)
(
((a⊗ b) ∗ a)& ((a⊗ b) ∗ b)
)
&
(a⊕ b)
lsp and rsp
(
(a⊗ b) ∗ (a& b)
)
&
(a⊕ b)
add
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(χ{u::A} ∗ ρ{u::C})⊗ B
(χ{u::A}⊗ B) ∗ ρ{u::C}
lnspl
B⊗ (ρ{u::A} ∗ χ{u::C})
ρ{u::A} ∗ (B⊗ χ{u::C})
lnspr
!(?χ{u::A} ∗ ξ{u::B})
?χ{u::A} ∗ !ξ{u::B}
lnbng
(χ{u::A} ∗ ξ{u::C})& (B
&
ξ{C})
(χ{u::A}&B) ∗ ξ{u::C}
lnaddl
(A
&
ξ{C})& (χ{u::B} ∗ ξ{u::C})
(A& χ{u::B}) ∗ ξ{u::C}
lnaddr
∀x. (χ{u::A} ∗ ξ{u::C})
(∀x. χ{u::A}) ∗ ξ{u::C}
lnall
B ∗ A
A ∗ B lncom
Figure 3: Rules of CLn
The formula in the premise is now provable in CLS under the interpretation of ∗ as
&
. As a general principle,
if there is more than one way to interpret a linkage, we should pick an interpretation that preserves provability.
3.1 Polarities as Organizational Hints
To build our provability-preserving interaction rules, we use the well known concept of polarity. Some rules of CLS
such as the split rules lsp and rsp or the choice rule chc add information to the proof; they correspond to proper
implications and are not invertible as rules. Other rules such as add or all are equivalences (the conclusion
implies the premise), and therefore the rules are invertible. Following general terminology, we say that the
connectives with non-invertible interactions have positive polarity, while those with invertible interactions have
negative polarity. More precisely, the formulas are separated into positive formulas (written P,Q, . . . ) and
negative formulas (written N,M, . . . ) according to the following grammar.
A,B, . . . ::= P N
P,Q, . . . ::= a A⊗ B 1 A⊕ B 0 !A ∃x.A
N,M, . . . ::= a A
&
B
T
A&B T ?A ∀x.A
Note that the dual of a positive formula is a negative formula and vice versa.
The key feature of polarity is that the rules for positive connectives commute with those for other positive
connectives, and likewise for negative connectives with other negative connectives, but the rules for positive and
negative connectives do not necessarily commute with each other. It is common to use this observation to design
a focused version of a sequent calculus with alternate positive and negative phases of rules [1, 8, 12]. Focusing
drastically reduces the non-determinism during proof search (see the experimental results in, e.g., [8, 13]), but
it also clarifies the structure of sequent proofs by identifying, precisely, the informative portions of full sequent
proofs. The calculus of structures can also be focused [7], although the phase structure is not as evident there
because of the incremental and interleaved nature of deep inference. We can, of course, adopt the full focusing
discipline in this paper, but the additional structure on proofs is sometimes counter-intuitive from a user’s
perspective. Instead, we will use features from focusing solely to handle the interaction connective ∗; in other
words, A
&
B is the ordinary unfocused formula, while A ∗ B denotes a focused interaction where, if either A
or B is positive then it behaves as the analogue of a focused formula (called the head in [7]). Note that, unlike
the system in [7], there can be zero, one, or two positive formulas in a focused interaction.
Figure 3 defines the system CLn of these focused rules for the interaction connective. In these rules, ρ
represents a positive formula context, i.e., for any formula A, the substitution ρ{A} is either A itself or a positive
formula. CLn can obviously be seen as a subsystem of CLS with the interpretation of ∗ as
&
and ignoring the
linkage information. In particular, it corresponds to that fragment of CLS that defines the interaction of two
&
-joined formulas. The number of occurrences of interaction formulas and marked subformulas is the same in
both premise and conclusion in every rule of CLn. The add rule of CLS splits into two forms in CLn, depending
on which of the operands of the & contains the linkage.
The system CLn defines all the rules for simplifying interactions. We embed it into a larger system, named
CLnS, that contains:
• the rules lnk, lnid, and unlnk (from above);
• the rules of CLn (Fig. 3); and
• the CLS rules com, asc, bot, wk, con, chc, wit, top, drl and all the rules in the final line in Fig. 2.
CLnS is relatively complete with respect to CLS. This does not mean, of course, that any application of lnk will
be valid; consider, for example, linking the a and the a in !a
&
a. Instead, we have the following correspondence.
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Theorem 4 (Completeness of CLnS Relative to CLS).
1. χ{ξ3{1}}
CLS
−−−→χ{ξ1{a}
&
ξ2{a}} iff χ{ξ3{1}}
CLnS
−−−−→χ{ξ1{a}
&
ξ2{a}}.
2. If A and B are not dual literals, then χ{ξ3{A
&
B}}
CLS
−−−→χ{ξ1{A}
&
ξ2{B}} iff χ{ξ3{A
&
B}}
CLnS
−−−−→χ{ξ1{A}
&
ξ2{B}}.
Proof. Every CLnS proof is manifestly a CLS proof under the interpretation of ∗ as
&
and eliding the links.
In the other direction, it suffices to observe that the lnk rule can be applied in such a way that the linked
subformulas are the immediate operands of the principal
&
. Thus, every CLS rule that involves an interaction
of two
&
-joined formulas can be simulated by a lnk, the corresponding CLn rule, and then unlnk or lnid. Once
the full CLS derivation has been simulated in CLnS in this way, we remove all but the deepest linkages on A and
B, and the corresponding instances of unlnk or lnid.
Corollary 5. A is provable in CLS if and only if it is provable in CLnS.
Proof. CLnS lacks all the CLS rules that permute a
&
into a smaller context: lsp, rsp, bng, add, and all. Thus,
the only way for two
&
-joined formulas to interact is by means lnk followed by CLn rules. We can thus appeal
to Thm. 4.
The CLn rules preserve the number of occurrences of linkages and interactions. Moreover, they are biased
to permute the negative connectives (i.e., & and ∀) out of the positive connectives. This guarantees that if
the conclusion of any CLn rule is provable in CLnS, then so is its premise; in other words, every rule of CLn is
invertible. The order of application of the CLn rules is therefore immaterial. While different orders can produce
different premises, the premises are equivalent.
Theorem 6 (Order Independence of CLn). If A
CLn
−−−→B and A′
CLn
−−−→B, then A ≡ A′.1
Proof. Straightforward inspection of the rules of CLn.
As a consequence, the only choices the user needs to explicitly instantiate an ∃ using wit, and contract a
?-formula using drl. The other choices in a proof—the multiplicative splits for ⊗ and disjunctive choices for
⊕—are deterministically inferred directly from the links.
Example 7. The following CLnS proof illustrates the use of linking.
∀y, z. 1
∀y, z. u::p(y) ∗ u::p(y)
lnid
∀y, z. (u::p(y)⊕ p(z)) ∗ (p(c)⊕ u::p(y))
chc× 2
∀y.
(
∀z. u::p(y)⊕ p(z)
)
∗
(
p(c)⊕ u::p(y)
) lnall
∀y.
(
∃x. ∀z. u::p(x)⊕ p(z)
)
∗
(
p(c)⊕ u::p(y)
) wit
(
∃x. ∀y. u::p(x)⊕ p(y)
)
∗
(
∀y. p(c)⊕ u::p(y)
) lnall
(
∃x. ∀y. u::p(x)⊕ p(y)
)
∗
(
∃x. ∀y. p(x)⊕ u::p(y)
) wit
(
∃x.∀y. p(x)⊕ p(y)
)
&
(
∃x.∀y. p(x)⊕ p(y)
) lnk
Observe that the CLn rules are interleaved with the other rules of CLnS.
It is instructive to compare the CLn rules with the similar focused interaction rules of LSF [7], which is a
polarized and focused variant of CLS. Most of the rules for positive connectives are the same, except for lnbng,2
which differs only in the fact that the interaction ∗ does not dissipate into a
&
in CLn. As a result, CLn requires
rules for interactions between negative formulas as well, while LSF defines focused interactions only for one
positive interacting with one negative formula. Conceptually, a CLnS proof can be viewed as an LSF proof where
several neighbouring (focused) interactions are merged into one.
3.2 Positive Equality and First-Order Effects
Let us call a sequence of applications of CLnS rules that begin at the bottom with lnk and end at the top with
its corresponding unlnk or lnid a linking phase. Of the non-CLn rules in Ex. 7, the instances of drl and chc are
all forced and can be done automatically. The instances of wit, on the other hand, require user guidance. The
quantifier structure of this theorem requires the application of at least one lnall before a wit, so in the general
case the system will not be able to keep all the rules of a single linking phase together in a block, i.e., the linking
1A ≡ B can be defined as usual as (A
&
B) & (B
&
A).
2In the polarized setting, there would be a similar case for the ↓ connective that can be seen as a purely linear variant of !.
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phase are not atomic. Notice that this problem is only significant in the first-order case; for the propositional
connectives, we can add rules such as the following to perform a non-CLn rule in the middle of a CLn derivation.
(χ{u::A}) ∗ ξ{u::B}
(?χ{u::A}) ∗ ξ{u::B}
lndrl
χ{u::A} ∗ ξ{u::C}
(χ{u::A}⊕ B) ∗ ξ{u::C}
lnlch
χ{u::B} ∗ ξ{u::C}
(A⊕ χ{u::B}) ∗ ξ{u::C}
lnrch
To make the linking phase atomic, we add an equality predicate to the language, change lnid to introduce
equations between the terms, and add the following lnwit rule to CLn.
s1 = t1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ sn = tn
u::p(s1, . . . , sn) ∗ u::p(t1, . . . , tn)
lnid
∃x.
(
χ{u::A} ∗ ξ{u::B}
)
(
∃x. χ{u::A}
)
∗ ξ{u::B}
lnwit
Example 8. Let us revisit Ex. 7 using the above rules. We have this derivation.
∃x. ∀y. ∃x1. ∀y1. x1 = y
∃x.∀y. ∃x1. ∀y1. u::p(x1) ∗ u::p(y)
lnid
∃x.∀y. ∃x1. ∀y1. (u::p(x1)⊕ p(y1)) ∗ (p(x)⊕ u::p(y))
lnlch, lnrch
∃x.∀y. ∃x1.
(
∀z. u::p(y)⊕ p(y1)
)
∗
(
p(x)⊕ u::p(y)
) lnall
∃x.∀y.
(
∃x1. ∀y1. u::p(x1)⊕ p(y1)
)
∗
(
p(x)⊕ u::p(y)
) lnwit
∃x.
(
∃x1. ∀y. u::p(x1)⊕ p(y)
)
∗
(
∀y. p(x)⊕ u::p(y)
) lnall
(
∃x. ∀y. u::p(x)⊕ p(y)
)
∗
(
∃x. ∀y. p(x)⊕ u::p(y)
) lnwit
(
∃x.∀y. p(x)⊕ p(y)
)
&
(
∃x. ∀y. p(x)⊕ p(y)
) lnk
The derivation can now keep all the CLn rules together.
A linking phase now ends (reading from conclusion to premise) with either lnid or unlnk. In Ex. 8 above,
the residual premise after the lnid is essentially a first-order unification problem. The equations formed by the
instances of lnid are all positively signed atomic formulas, with the following two rules.
1
x = x
refl
s1 = s2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ sn = tn
f(s1, . . . , sn) = f(t1, . . . , tn)
cong
Fact 9. The rules refl, cong, and 1−→1⊗ 1 suffice to show that t = t for any term t.
Since every derivation can be embedded in any formula context, we thus obtain a smooth continuum between
deduction and unification in terms of the equality predicate. This freedom comes at a price: the order of the
applications of lnwit and lnall is now important.
Example 10. This is what happens if the lnwit and lnall rules of Ex. 8 are done in the wrong order.
∃x, x1. ∀y, y1. x1 = y1
∃x, x1. ∀y, y1. u::p(x1) ∗ u::p(y1)
lnid
∃x, x1. ∀y, y1.
(
u::p(x1)⊕ p(y)
)
∗
(
p(x)⊕ u::p(y1)
) lnlch, lnrch
∃x, x1. ∀y.
(
u::p(x1)⊕ p(y)
)
∗
(
∀y1. p(x)⊕ u::p(y1)
) lnall
∃x, x1.
(
∀y. u::p(x1)⊕ p(y)
)
∗
(
∀y. p(x)⊕ u::p(y)
) lnall
∃x.
(
∃x1. ∀y. u::p(x1)⊕ p(y)
)
∗
(
∀y. p(x)⊕ u::p(y)
) lnwit
(
∃x. ∀y. u::p(x)⊕ p(y)
)
∗
(
∃x. ∀y. p(x)⊕ u::p(y)
) lnwit
(
∃x. ∀y. p(x)⊕ p(y)
)
&
(
∃x.∀y. p(x)⊕ p(y)
) lnk
The residual premise is unprovable.
It is not possible to fix this problem without further user guidance, because determining the correct quantifier
nesting is equivalent to the full theorem proving problem for first-order logic, which is unsolvable. Fortunately,
there is only a single critical pair that needs to be resolved: an interaction between two ∃-formulas. In every
other case, we can appeal to Thm 6, suitably generalized.
Our solution therefore involves a modification to linkages. We now have two kinds of oriented linkages, u≫A
(called a source) and u≪A (called a sink), with u::A standing for either form when irrelevant. The lnk rule is
modified to produce a single source and sink pair:
ξ{χ1{u≫A} ∗ χ2{u≪B}}
ξ{χ1{A}
&
χ2{B}}
lnk
Most of the remaining rules stay the same, except for the following new rule for resolving an interaction between
∃-formulas.
∃y.
(
(∃x. χ{u≫A}) ∗ ξ{u≪B}
)
(
∃x. χ{u≫A}
)
∗
(
∃y. ξ{u≪B}
) lnex
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Intuitively, the source is “brought to” the sink. The rules are prioritized so that the lnwit rule is only applicable
in the case that lnex is not. Note that if the source is not on the left of the interaction ∗, then the lncom rule
can be used to put it there. Let CLonS stand for:
CLnS ∪ {lndrl, lnlch, lnrch, lnwit, lnex} ∪ {refl, cong}
(with the understanding that the lnk rule introduces oriented linkages), and let CLon stand for CLonS \ CLS.
Theorem 11 (Order Independence of CLon). If A
CLon
−−−−→B and A′
CLon
−−−−→B, then A ≡ A′.
Proof. Same idea as for Thm. 6.
Theorem 12. For any formula A free of =-subformulas, 1
CLonS
−−−−→A if and only if 1
CLnS
−−−−→A.
Sketch. For the forward direction (only if), the CLonS rules lnwit, lnex, lndrl, lnlch and lnrch are admissible in
CLnS. To recover the CLnS proof, it suffices to use the wit, drl and chc rules to rewrite all the instances of lnwit,
lnex, lndrl, lnlch and lnrch. Then, these rules can be permuted below any occurrences of (the CLonS variant of)
lnid on subformulas. This leaves just the instances of refl and cong above the CLonS variants of lnid; but, these
rules do not interact with any other rules, and can therefore be permuted to stand in a block right above the
lnid that gives rise to them; the entire block can then be replaced with the CLnS variant of lnid.
The reverse direction (if) is a simple consequence of Fact 9.
4 Implementation Notes
The classical system CLonS has been implemented as part of the interactive proving tool Profound [6]. The tool is
launched by giving it a goal theorem either on the command line or using an input file. It then presents the user
with an interface where the text of the theorem may be directly manipulated (using the keyboard or the mouse)
in two modes: a logical mode and a linking mode. In the logical mode, the user is allowed to perform any of the
rules in CLonS \ CLon. In other words, the only non-trivial actions available in this mode are: (1) instantiating
∃ (wit) and choice (chc) when there are no linkages, and (2) contraction (con) and weakening (wk). The user
is also allowed the freedom to freely reorganize the formula using associativity and commutativity of
&
. The
system lets the user also treat the other binary connectives as associative and commutative (the corresponding
rules are admissible in CLS and CLnS).
In the linking mode, the user indicates an oriented link between a pair of subformulas. Using the keyboard,
this amounts to traversing the subformula tree and marking two subformulas that are ancestrally
&
-linked as
source and sink. This action is more intuitive with a pointing device such as the mouse, where one subformula is
simply dragged and dropped on another. The main difficulty with pointing is to determine which subformulas
the user wishes to point to, as most cursor positions occur within many subformulas. The system uses the
heuristic of selecting the smallest subformula surrounding the cursor position, and letting the user go up in the
subformula tree by scrolling the mouse-wheel.3
The current implementation of Profound is in OCaml and uses the GTK+ windowing library for its graphical
interface, and has been tested to run on POSIX-compatible systems such as Linux and Mac OS X. In the future,
we will probably re-implement it as a server/client setup using Javascript and using the HTML5 Canvas library
for the user interface, which would make it portable across a wide range of platforms that support graphical web-
browsers. Systems that can support multiple pointers and different interaction metaphors such as “pinching”
might also enable Profound to perform marking or linking of formulas more directly.
In the rest of this section, we will describe some additional features of Profound that are not strictly part of
the CLonS proof system, but are nevertheless very important for practical use of linking-based interaction.
4.1 Implicit Contraction
Perhaps the most natural aspect of the linking-based interaction metaphor is the ability to treat a logical
problem as a kind of matching puzzle: bits of the current obligation are linked to bits of known facts and
lemmas until the problem reduces to a known and manageable form. However, the formal CLonS system does
require an additional step of explicit contraction that can complicates this simple aspect. For example, suppose
we want to prove ?(a⊗ b)
&
?(a⊗ c)
&
?a
&
(b⊗ c). The ideal linking-based proof would just link the a to the
two occurrences of a. However, the first link would “consume” the ?a. The user is forced to explicitly contract
it before drawing the links.
In Profound, this issue is solved by means of special variants of lnk that store a copy of the ?formula for reuse
in subsequent links. One such rule is as follows.
ξ
{
?χ1{A}
&
(
?χ1{u≫A} ∗ χ2{u≪B}
)}
ξ{?χ1{A}
&
χ2{B}}
3Unfortunately, this turns out to be fairly frustrating when trying to select, for instance, the subformula B
&
C from A
&
B
&
C,
because
&
is internally treated as a left-associative binary operator. The user is forced to first bring the entire subformula they
wish to select to the left (which can be done freely in the logical mode).
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Of course, this incurs the dual overhead of ?-formulas that survive unnecessarily. The user will need to clear
them with explicit instances of wk, which can quickly become burdensome. From our experimentation, there
does not seem to be a preferable default, so Profound allows both contracting and non-contracting uses of lnk.
Indeed, Profound allows the user to independently decide to contract the source and the sink when marking
them.
There is a related issue when marking the source and the sink that are not ancestrally
&
-related, but
that have an ancestral ?. The simplest example is ?(a⊕ a). With the CLonS calculus and implicit linking as
described, the user will still not be able to link the a and the a without first explicitly contracting the formula.
This is not an altogether contrived example: consider the actual representation of the classical Drinker’s formula,
?∃x.∀y. (p(x)⊕ p(y)), as opposed to its linear version in Ex. 7. To solve this issue, we further extend the lnk
rule to allow contraction at an ancestral ? when there is no ancestral
&
as follows.
ξ{?(χ1{u≫A} ◦ χ2{B}) ∗ ?(χ1{A} ◦ χ2{u≪B})}
ξ{?(χ1{A} ◦ χ2{B})}
where ◦ ∈ {⊗,⊕,&}.
4.2 Other Convenience Features
The CLonS system is cut-free, but in practice it is invaluable to use cuts in a proof, both for conceptual and
textual simplicity. The Profound implementation therefore allows the user to introduce a cut at any moment,
even in the middle of constructing a link. Instead of the general cut rule, however, we actually implement the
following variant, which is a composition of the usual cut rule and rsp.
A⊗ (A
&
C)
C
The rules for conjunctive truth on the last line of Fig. 2, while sufficient for completeness, are generally too
cumbersome to use in practice. Instead, Profound actually implements the following monoidal versions (which
are all derivable);
A
A ◦ †
A
† ◦A
1
1 ◦ 1
A
∀x.A
A
∃x.A
where 〈◦, †〉 ∈ {〈⊗, 1〉 , 〈⊕, 0〉 , 〈&,T〉}, and in the final two rules x is not free in A. In fact, these rules are not
explicitly presented to the user, but are instead folded into the traversal mechanism. That is, whenever the
cursor on † in A ◦ † or † ◦A, traversing to the parent simply changes the entire formula to A. This allows us to
implement chc in a very simple manner: we just add the following general rule:
0
A del
The user can use del to change any subformula to 0, and if it is the operand of a ⊕ then traversing to the parent
will remove the 0 as a side effect. We find this to be a solid improvement over a direct use of chc, which would
otherwise require a further clarification from the user.
5 Caveats
It is important to point out that Profound is only a research prototype at this point. To make it more broadly
viable, we need at least two more crucial features that would require basic research on the calculus of structures.
• Support for intensional equality and induction: in order to make Profound suitable as a user interface for
reasoning about computational specifications, the logic must be extended to support intensional (predicate)
equality and induction. Equality can be supported by the rules of unification logic, which can be turned
into a contextual and incremental form without too much effort. However, for practical uses it will
need to support reasoning about equality transitively (e.g., to show
(
(x 6= z)⊗ (x 6= s(z)
)
&
0 where z
and s represent zero and successor, respectively). In the general case this will amount to (incremental)
congruence-closure.
The general induction rules in the style of LINC [18] or µMALL [2] can be readily added to the deep
inference formalism. However, experience suggests that proofs written using such induction rules tend to
be verbose and confusing. It is more standard to use more restricted induction schemas based on subterm
or lexicographic ordering, such as in the Abella system [9]. Unfortunately, such restricted schemas tend to
have a global and shallow flavour that runs counter to the incremental nature of deep inference. However,
the final word is far from written on this matter.
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• Support for typed and higher-order reasoning: supporting typed first-order terms is completely straightfor-
ward and Profound already assumes that the predicates and terms are simply typed. We intend to extend it
to support polymorphically typed predicates and terms in the near future. Supporting dependently typed
terms is not particularly critical as dependent restrictions can be recovered relationally; nevertheless, con-
structing a variant of the calculus of structure for dependent types is an open problem. Second-order
quantification [16] should be straightforward. Extending the calculus of structures to full higher-order
logic is also open.
Acknowledgements: We thank Dale Miller and Lutz Straßburger for their help with many aspects of this work.
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